The personal diaries of politicians represent a very important material for knowing many of the mysteries of Sudanese politics. Unfortunately, most Sudanese politicians do not write their memoirs, which contributes to the loss of truth and gives ample space to claimants of heroism and falsifiers of history. He hurries to write his memoirs to shed light on the political history of Sudan and pushes in the direction of stating the facts and exposing the falsity
I read these days in the memoirs of Shawqi Malasi, the well-known Baathist leader, and the memoirs were issued in 2004 and are issued by Dar Azza in Khartoum under the title Sudanese Papers Testimonies and Views Editing and Presenting Muhammad Sayed Ahmed Ateeq and despite my great disagreement with the Baathists in thought and politics, reading Shawqi Malasi’s memoirs gave me an opportunity to see some The secrets of Sudanese politics and the man spoke very frankly, and this is praiseworthy. The notes cover a relatively wide period of time and provide the reader with many facts that may be hidden from many. For example, he talks about his relationship with the People’s Democratic Party headed by Sheikh Ali Abdel Rahman and the relationship of the federalists to military coups and his relationship with Sharif Hussein Al-Hindi and Al-Dustour magazine The London opposition to the Nimeiri regime and the secrets of the coup of Hashem al-Atta.. to other topics
The topics of the memoirs are many, but I was stopped by the pages in which Shawki Malasi told about his experience in the purification committee that was formed after the October Revolution, headed by Ahmed Suleiman, the communist minister at the time. As part of what took place in its deliberations and its course, and came to an important conclusion at the end of this chapter, Shawqi Malasi concluded in the conclusion of his talk about his experience in the purification committee to the following and we will quote from his memoirs verbatim: And government administrations stated that, for the most part, they were based on personal grudges and settling scores among employees, and this resulted in the Sudanese civil service losing a number of experienced leaders in its various fields.
In this chapter, we complete some lessons before concluding. Shawqi Malasi mentioned that among the detainees in Kober prison at the time was Major General Abaru, one of the senior leaders of the security services during the era of Aboud. Shawqi told about a deal that Major General Abaru presented to the purification committee in exchange for his detention being transferred from prison. Cooper only led to a house arrest, and the content of the deal was for Major General Aparo to reveal to them the member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, who was cooperating with them in the security, and he was guiding them to the secret dens that the security had raided in recent times, and also to reveal to them their relationship as a body with the officials in the American embassy in Khartoum, says Shawky. He was pleased with this deal and went to meet Ahmed Suleiman, the head of the purification committee and the communist minister, so he met him and was alone with him and told him about the offer made by Major General Aparo and encouraged him that it was an opportunity for them in the party to know the source of the successive strikes on them, but Shawqi says that Ahmed Suleiman shocked him by saying this is nonsense and that Major General Abaru He plans to escape, and thus the communist minister was able to distract Shawki Malasi from the issue of penetrating security during the era of Abboud for the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Sudanese Communist Party. It seems that Shawki Malasi was good. Too much when the communist minister was presented with this offer. How could he expect the communists to agree to declare that there is a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Communist Party a traitor to the party and deals with the security services against his party, and they are the ones who filled the world with uproar about the revolutionary purity and heroic steadfastness of their leaders before the November military junta During Abboud’s era, how would the future of the Communist Party and its political performance in those days would have been if the deal was done and the traitorous Central Committee member was announced, and how would the newspapers’ headlines at that time be, and how would the political nights of the communists’ opponents be ignited?
Linking history to reality, the story of Major General Abaru, which he mentioned in his memoirs, sheds light on the eagerness of some parties to control the security apparatus and take over its management by civilians. Whoever puts his hand on these files will probably move in two tracks: the first track is to cover up his membership cooperating with the security apparatus, and the second track is to expose members of other parties cooperating with the security apparatus, finish their political future as individuals and parties, and distort the image of all those who belong to it. Perhaps this explains the recent statements of proof that the The security apparatus is a military apparatus and will remain in the hands of the military. Perhaps this statement disappointed many
History does not repeat itself as some think, but its events are similar to a great extent and here is the lesson and the place of preaching, but we continue to falter a lot in our path because politicians do not write or because our history is written by our opponents and enemies, and in both cases the homeland is lost